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Supreme Court Review
McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ZONING BY-LAW PROHIBITING SIGNS ON
PRIVATE PROPERTY - APPLICABILITY TO FEDERAL ELECTION SIGNS.
By a bare majority,' the full court in McKay v. The Queen2
decided that municipal zoning legislation prohibiting signs on private
property could not apply to election signs in the course of a federal
election. The facts were not disputed. During a federal election cam-
paign the appellants had attached to their verandah a 14" x 16"
sign proclaiming: "Vote David Middleton, New Democratic Party".
They were charged with and convicted of infringing a municipal
zoning by-law which prohibited the display of signs (with certain
exceptions not here relevant) in a residential zone.3
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Cartwright saw the issues
as (1) whether the provincial Legislature had the power to authorize
the prohibition of the display of election posters on private property
in the course of a federal election, and if not, (2) whether the by-law
should be construed so as to apply to election posters.
In answering the first question, his Lordship looked to s. 92(13)
of the British North America Act,4 on which the respondent relied,
and stated:
Whether or not the right of an elector at a Federal election to seek by
lawful means to influence his fellow electors to vote for the candidate
of his choice is aptly described as a civil right need not be discussed; it
is clearly not a civil right in the Province. It is a right enjoyed by the
elector not as a resident of Ontario but as a citizen of Canada.5
This doctrine, originating in a dictum of Duff C.J.C. in Re Alberta
Statutes,6 has in the past enjoyed a doubtful status in the Supreme
1 Cartwright J. (Taschereau C.J.C., Abbott, Judson, Spence JJ., con-
curring); Martland J. dissenting (Fauteux, Ritchie, Hall JJ., concurring).
2 [19651 S.C.R. 798, (1966), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.
3 Section 9.3-Subject to compliance with the regulations under section
6, the following regulations shall apply in an R2 zone.
Section 9.3.1-USE: No building, structure or land shall be used and no
building or structure shall be hereafter erected, structurally altered,
enlarged or maintained except for the following uses:
Section 9.3.1.7-SIGNS: Signs in accordance with the regulations in
section 6.14(e).
Section 6.14(e)-SIGNS: Residential-one non-illuminated real estate
sign not exceeding four square feet in area, advertising the sale, rental
or lease of any building, structure or lot and/or one non-illuminated
trespassing, safety or caution sign not exceeding one square foot in
area, and/or one sign indicating the name and profession of a physician
shall be permitted. Bulletin boards advertising sub-divisions in which
lots are for sale and/or advertising building projects.
4 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
5 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 804 (S.C.R.), 537 (D.L.R.). In support of this
principle, which he found implicit in every judgment of the Court in the
recent case of Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v.
Imperial OiL Ltd., [19631 S.C.R. 584, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 45 W.W.R. 1, it pleased
his Lordship to quote from the judgments of Martland and Ritchie JJ. both
of whom conspicuously dissented in the instant case.
6 [19381 S.C.R. 100.
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Court of Canada.7 In McKay v. The Queen8 this doctrine, which con-
tains profound implications of unforeseeable dimension in consti-
tutional law, has been elevated to the law of the land. A discussion
(which Cartwright J. considered unnecessary) of some of these im-
plications will be made below.
Employing a shotgun technique, Cartwright J. continued to give
reasons why such legislation was the sole preserve of the federal
Parliament.
A political activity in the Federal field which has heretofore been lawful
can, in my opinion, be prohibited only by Parliament.9
His Lordship also felt inclined to agree-although did not find it
necessary to reach a definite conclusion-that by enacting the
Canada Elections Act 10 and in particular s. 71, Parliament had
"occupied the field". In his carefully reasoned minority opinion, Mr.
Justice Martland leveled devastating criticism on this position. An
examination of the relevant provisions" disclosed no recognition by
Parliament, express or implied, of an overriding right to erect any-
where a sign for purposes of political propaganda.1 2
Finally Cartwright J. concluded with the point which divided
the Supreme Court of Canada.
In my opinion, the Legislature has no power to enact a prohibition of
the sort which By-law 11737, as construed by the Court of Appeal, contains
as such a prohibition would be a law in relation to proceedings at a
Federal election and not in relation to any subject-matter within the
provincial power.13
The subject matter of elections to Parliament was by its very nature
one which could not be regarded as coming within any of the classes
of subjects assigned to the provincial Legislatures. 14 The fact that
Parliament has abstained from legislating to the full limit of its
powers does not transfer any such power to the provinces, and what
the Legislature cannot do directly it cannot do indirectly.15
7 This issue had been raised in Saumur v. City of Quebec [1953) 2 S.C.R.
299 and Svwtzman v. Elbling and A.-G. of Quebec, [1957] S.C.R. 285, but the
Court was badly split in its reasons and no majority could be marshalled
either for or against the proposition.
8 S~upra, footnote 2.
9 Ibid., at p. 804 (S.C.R.), 537 (D.L.R.).
10 S.C. 1960, c. 39.
11 S.C. 1960, c. 39, ss. 49(3), 49(4), 71,100(1), 100(2).
12 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 809 (S.C.R.), 542 (D.L.R.).
13 Ibid., at pp. 805-806 (S.C.R.), 538-539 (D.L.R.).
14 VaZin v. Langlois (1879), 3 S.C.R. 1, at p. 71, per Taschereau J.: "It
is admitted, and is beyond doubt, that the Parliament of Canada has the
exclusive power of legislation over Dominion controverted elections. By the
lex Parliamentario, as well as by the 41st, 91st, and 92nd sections of the
British North America Act, this power is as complete as if it was specially
and by name contained in the enumeration of the federal powers of section
91, just as promissory notes, Insolvency, etc., are."
15 The constitutional grounds on which Cartwright J. rested his judgment
can be summarized as follows:
(1) There are certain civil rights which are outside the scope of provincial
control under s. 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act, and the right to seek by
lawful means to influence one's fellow electors is such a civil right.




It is unfortunate that Mr. Justice Cartwright decided the case
without grappling with the basic issues. The minority were quite
prepared to concede that the regulation of federal elections was out-
side the jurisdiction of the provincial Legislatures, but does the dis-
play of an election poster by a private individual on his own property
fall within proceedings at an election? 16 Even if it does, is this a
field of concurrent jurisdiction, so that until Parliament effectively
occupies it, the Provinces may legislate for provincial purposes though
incidentally it may affect the means of propaganda used by an
individual or by a political party during a Federal election campaign?
To give a satisfactory answer to these questions it is essential to
examine the nature of Canadian political elections and political insti-
tutions. In a democratic society, such as our own, there is a critical
relationship between free public discussion of political affairs and the
functioning of a responsible Parliament.
The statute [i.e. the British North America Act] contemplates a parlia-
ment working under the influence of public opinion and public discussions
* . . This is signally true in respect of the discharge by Ministers of the
Crown of their responsibility to Parliament, by members of Parliament
of their duty to the electors, and by the electors themselves of their
responsibilities in the election of their representatives. 7
The institution derives its vigour and vitality from the free concourse
and conflict of public opinion and public discussion. The freedom to
express one's views and to solicit political support is the very essence
of an election18 and the dissemination of opinions and solicitations to
(2) A political activity in the federal field which has heretofore been
lawful can be prohibited only by Parliament and this by-law, if
construed as required by the respondents, destroys rights to engage
in a form of political activity in the federal field which has hereto-
fore been possessed and exercised by electors without question.
(3) Parliament by enacting the Canada Elections Act, and especially
s. 71 thereof, has effectively occupied the field.
(4) Proceedings at a federal election are a subject matter under the
sole constitutional jurisdiction of Parliament, and the display of
election posters by private individuals on private property fall within
the concept of proceedings at federal elections.
16 It had been argued by the appellants that the display of posters was
in relation to "Proceedings at Elections" within the meaning of s. 41 of the
B.N.A. Act and therefore subject exclusively to federal legislation. Martland
. rejected this contention on the grounds that s. 41 was an interim provision,
now exhausted, and the law relating to proceedings at federal elections is to
be found in the Canada Elections Act.
17 Referenwe re Alberta Btatutes, supra, footnote 6, at p. 133, per
Duff C.J.C.
18 Dionne v. Municipal Court of Montreal (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727 (Que.
S.C.), where Scott Associate C.J. overruled a magistrate's conviction of a
candidate for the Labour Progressive Party in a federal election, who, without
having obtained a permit from the Police Department, in contravention of a
by-law, distributed from door to door circulars soliciting votes. The by-law
was struck down. The case is distinguishable from McKay v. The Queen in
that the by-law was discriminatory because it vested a discretion in the Chief
of Police who could either grant or withhold the permit. Martland J. points
out that the by-law in the instant case is of general application and in no
sense discriminatory. Bupra, footnote 2, at pp. 811-812 (S.C.R.), 543-544
(D.L.R.).
1966]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the public in the course of an election campaign is to such a signifi-
cant extent accomplished by means of posters, placards and signs
that their display must be considered an integral part of Canadian
elections. Any prohibition or restriction on the reasonable display
of election advertisements interferes with the course of an election..
Election posters and handbills play a major role in bringing a candi-
date and his cause to the attention of the electorate and establish
some degree of acquaintance without which an even remotely intelli-
gent choice on the part of the elector is impossible. It is of the essence
of parliamentary government that candidates for office be free to
approach the electorate and make their candidacy and ideas known
to them by means of posters, placards and signs. Any gratuitous
interference with this right is an unwarranted restriction on the
effectiveness of the democratic process of government. 19
Referring to the B.N.A. Act 20 and the Canada Elections Act21
in Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Quebec,22 Mr. Justice Abbott stated:
Implicit in all such legislation is the right of candidates for Parliament
or for a Legislature, and of citizens generally, to explain, criticize, debate
and discuss in the freest possible manner such matters as the qualifica-
tons, the policies, and the political, economic and social principles
advocated by such candidates or by the political parties or groups of
which they may be members.
This right cannot be abrogated by a Provincial Legislature, and the power
of such Legislature to limit it, is restricted to what may be necessary to
protect purely private rights, such as for example provincial laws of
defamation.23
It is in this preceding paragraph that Abbott J. touches upon a prob-
lem which is at the core of McKay v. The Queen.24 The subject matter
of the by-law, as construed by the Court of Appeal, 25 possesses aspects
which could conceivably bring it within the legislative jurisdiction
of both Parliament and the Legislature. The trial judge,26 the Court
of Appeal, and the minority in the Supreme Court of Canada con-
cluded that this was a field of concurrent jurisdiction. That being so,
19 In defining the limit beyond which provincial legislation cannot affect
the right of free public discussion, Martland J., in another case, adopting the
reasoning of Duff C.J.C. in Re Alberta Statutes, supra, footnote 6, stated:
"The test stated is as to whether legislation effects such a curtailment of the
exercise of the right of public discussion as substantially to interfere with
the working of the parliamentary institutions of Canada." See Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union v. Imperial Oil Ltd., supra, footnote 5,
at p. 12 (D.L.R.).
20 Supra, footnote 4.
21 Supra, footnote 10.
22 S.pra, footnote 7.
23 fbid., at pp. 327-328.
24 Supra, footnote 2.
25 [1964) 1 O.R. 641, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 (Ont. C.A.). For a comment, see
(1965), 3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 384.
26 Hughes J. based his decision on two grounds: (1) the display of election
posters at election time is not a user of land and the by.law which was not
intended to regulate signs qua signs had no application in this case; (2) the
posting of election signs related to "proceedings at elections", a field which
the Dominion Parliament had occupied by enacting the Canada Elections Act.
See [19631 2 O.R. 162, 38 D.L.R. (2d) 668 (Ont. H.C.).
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the Province can legislate until the Dominion occupies the field. Thus
Mr. Justice Martland found:
... [PIrovincial legislation in relation to the use of property, which, in
its pith and substance, is in relation to property and civil rights in the
Province, and which is of general application, is not only valid, but
can apply even though, incidently, it may affect the means of propaganda
used by an individual or by a political party during a Federal election
campaign. 27
At this point, a consideration of some problems posed by Ayles-
worth J.A. in the Court of Appeal would assist to clarify the issue.
His Lordship found the phrase "proceedings at elections" so broad in
its essence as to include much of property and civil rights within a
Province.28 Similarly what might well be considered property and
civil rights within a province in many instances would have to do
with something which could, in its broadest sense, be considered pro-
ceedings at elections. To illustrate his point Aylesworth J.A. conceives
of a parade of considerable magnitude, consisting of adherents to a
particular political party engaged in the election, taking place in a
crowded thoroughfare. Such parade could involve important civil
rights within the province relative to endangerment of the public
peace, control of traffic and to interference with the ordinary use
of the streets by the citizen. Is the Province or municipality to stand
by, impotent to intervene, because the concourse could, in its broadest
sense, be considered proceedings at elections? The answer is an un-
equivocal no, but in arriving at this answer, the relative importance
of the aspects of the subject matter must be weighed against each
other to determine where the legislative competence lies. The doctrine
of concurrent powers arises only where the federal and provincial
aspects of the challenged law are of equivalent importance and the
allocation of exclusive power one way or the other is not possible.
29
The issue in McKay v. The Queen is ultimately whether the
display of election posters on private property during the course of
an election campaign and the right of neighbouring property owners
to prevent the temporary display of such posters on the grounds that
it offends their taste or detracts from the appearance of the neigh-
bourhood, are of equivalent importance.31 This is a question of values.
27 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 811 (S.C.R.), 544 (D.L.R.).
28 Aylesworth J.A. refers to the phrase "proceedings at elections" as
contained in s. 41 of the B.N.A. Act. The argument that federal jurisdiction
could be based upon this section was demolished by Martland J. in the
Supreme Court of Canada (supra, footnote 16); however, if the section is
inapplicable, the concept still has meaning and would fall within the federal
residual power.
29 W. R. Lederman, Book Review of Peace, Order and Good Government:
A New Constitution for Canada (by Peter J. T. O'Hearn) (1965), 43 Can. Bar
Rev. 669, at p. 672.
30 Supra, footnote 2.
31 See the words of Aylesworth J.A. in the Court of Appeal, supra, foot-
note 25, at pp. 404405 (D.L.R.): "It lies, we think, within the legislative
ambit of the municipality in a defined residential zone under a properly
phrased restrictive by-law to legislate in prohibition of, for example, election
signs, even erected by individuals upon their own property in the area, for
the purpose of protecting or preserving the property rights and enjoyment of
that individual's neighbours. Such signs and the erection of them might well,
[Footnote continued on page 304.]
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Martland J. thought that they were of equivalent importance whereas
Cartwright J. took the position that the importance of permitting
a candidate in an electoral campaign to present his message to the
electorate outweighs the temporary inconvenience to neighbouring
landowners caused by the display of an election placard on private
property.32 On this assessment of the relative values of the competing
interests, this could not be a concurrent field of legislative jurisdiction,
and it was ultra vires the provincial Legislature to authorize the
enactment of such a by-law.
The abstinence of the Dominion Parliament from legislating to the full
limit of its powers, could not have the effect of transferring to any
provincial legislature the legislative power which had been assigned
to the Dominion by s. 91 of the Act of 1867.33
II
It is the first ground of Mr. Justice Cartwright's decision which
is of particular significance in this case. His Lordship decided that
there are certain civil rights outside the scope of provincial control
under s. 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act (Property and Civil Rights in the
Province), and that the right to seek by lawful means to influence
although not per se dangerous or such as to constitute a nuisance, yet be
inelegant, inartistic, otherwise objectionable to the surrounding residents in
the enjoyment of their property in the area and I repeat unless and until
the Parliament of Canada in its wisdom sees fit further to advance into the
field of proceedings at elections and in doing so to exclude the enactment of
legislation on property and civil rights with respect to such matters, the
Province remains free to authorize and the municipality remains free to enact
a by-law such as the by-law in question." For other examples of this balancing
of values, see People v. Stover (1963), 12 N.Y. 2d 462, 191 N.E. 2d 272, 240
N.Y.S. 2d 724, where a homeowner as a "political protest against high taxes"
in violation of a by-law hung laundry from year to year over his front lawn.
He was convicted. In a dissenting judgment it was maintained that the by-law
exceeded the municipality's zoning authority under the police power in that
it was not sufficiently related to the public safety, health, morals or welfare
of the community but was directed solely to aesthetic purposes. See also
Regina v. Campbell, [1962] O.R. 1134 (H. C.), aff'd [1963] 2 O.R. 149 (Ont.
C.A.) where a bearded poet was prevented by a municipal by-law from
holding a meeting in a public park. The Court held: "The purpose of the
legislation is not to put restraints on communications of ideas. In no sense
can it be said a denial of the right of free speech to pass legislation regulating
the parks in which, and the areas in which public meetings may be held."
32 This approach answers Mr. Justice Martland's objection that this
legislation was of general application, whereas the legislation in all the
other civil liberties cases was discriminatory in some aspect. The absence of
discrimination is not relevant to this point because it is the efficient function-
ing of parliamentary elections which is in issue. However, where civil liberties
are concerned, discrimination is of vital significance.
Mr. Justice Martland criticised the majority reliance on Union Colliery
Co. of British Columbia v. Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (passage cited infra)
because the legislation involved was discriminatory. The legislation in the
Bryden case was not ultra vires because it was discriminatory, but rather
the discriminatory element in the legislation altered its character from
legislation with respect to conditions of work to legislation with respect to
naturalization and aliens. The exhibition of an election poster is not the
display of a sign, but participation in political activity in a federal election.
The distinction is subtle but essential to the decision.
33 Union Colliery Company of British Columbia v. Bryden, supra, footnote
32, at p. 588, per Lord Watson.
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one's fellow electors is such a civil right.3 4 It is interesting to trace
the development of this theory of supra-provincial civil rights from
its germination in the dicta of Duff C.J.C. in Re Alberta Statutes,
35
through two civil liberties cases in the 1950's36 to McKay v. The
Queen.37 In considering an Alberta Statute38 which would have re-
quired newspapers to publish any statements provided by a Chairman
to be appointed for the purpose of clarifying social credit policies and
otherwise regulating newspapers, Duff C.J.C. stated:
Any attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress the
traditional form of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and
through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legis-
lature of any one of the provinces, as repugnant to the provisions of
The British. North America Act, by which the Parliament of Canada is
established as the legislative organ of the people of Canada under the
Crown, and Dominion legislation enacted pursuant to the legislative
authority given by those provisions. The subject matter of such leglsla-
tion could not be described as a provincial matter purely; as in substance
exclusively a matter (private or local) of property and civil rights
within the province, or a matter private or local within the province.
It would not be, to quote the words of the judgment of the Judicial
Committee in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King, "legislation directed
solely to the purposes specified in section 92";...
Some degree of regulation of newspapers everybody would concede to
the provinces. Indeed, there is a very wide field in which the provinces
undoubtedly are vested with legislative authority over newspapers; but
the limit, in our opinion is reached when the legislation effects such a
curtailment of the exercise of the right of public discussion as substan-
tially to interfere with the working of the parliamentary institutions of
Canada as contemplated by the provision of The British North America
Act and the statutes of the Dominion of Canada.
39
The Chief Justice declined to express an opinion upon the concrete
question whether or not the particular measure was invalid as exceed-
ing these limits, since he considered it to be ancillary to the rest of
the legislation and fell with it.
Fifteen years later, the dicta of Duff C.J.C. were repudiated by
Kerwin J. who said:
•.. I also think that freedom of the press is a civil right in the Province.
In RBe Alberta Information Act, Sir Lyman Duff stated a short ground
considered by him (and Davis J.) sufficient to dispose of the question
as to whether Bill No. 9 of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, "An
Act to Ensure the Publication of Accurate News and Information" was
34 The vagueness of the phrase "by lawful means" may give rise to some
difficulty. It is submitted that it must refer to the moral quality (measured
against the community's standard of political morality) of the means used
to influence voters. This also is a question of values. Fraud, violence and
bribery are deprecated because they deprive electors of their free and in-
telligent choice. It is at the point where propaganda ceases to inform and
promote intelligent choice, that it becomes objectionable and hence unlawful.
To give this phrase a wider meaning so as to apply to a breach of a by-law
would simply raise the question, what is lawful? The consequence would
inevitably be circular reasoning in the decision making process.
35 Supra, footnote 6.
36 Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, footnote 7, and Switzman v. Elbling
and A.-G. of Quebec, ibid.
37 Supra footnote 2.
38 The Accurate News and Information Act. The Act never received
royal assent.
39 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 134.
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ultra vires the Legislature of that Province. With the greatest respect
I am unable to agree with that part of his ensuing reasons for judgment.
. . and particularly the following statement:-"Any attempt to abrogate
this right of public debate or to express the traditional forms of the
exercise of the right (in public meeting and through the press), would,
in our opinion be incompetent to the Legislature of the Province."...
We have not a Bill of Rights such as is contained in the United States
Constitution and decisions on that part of the latter are of no assistance.
While it is true that, as recited in the preamble to the British North
America Act the three Provinces expressed a desire to be federally united
with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, a
complete division of legislative powers being effected by the Act, I
assume as it was assumed in Be Adoption Act... that Provincial Legis-
latures are willing and able to deal with matters of importance and
substance that are within their legislative jurisdiction. It is perhaps
needless to say that nothing in the foregoing has reference to matters
that are confined to Parliament.40
The judgment of Mr. Justice Rand in the same case bristles with
unforeseeable implications. He notes that legislation from the Quebec
Act to the B.N.A. Act contained special provisions for safeguarding
the religious observances of Roman Catholics. If matters of religious
belief were to be subsumed under s. 92 (13) (Property and Civil Rights
in the Province) or s. 92(16) (Matters of a merely local or private
nature in the Province), all these exceptional safeguards would have
been redundant. The inference to be drawn from this observation is
that religion cannot be classified as a matter of property and civil
rights within the province, or a matter of a merely local or private
nature in the province.41 However, Rand J. does not stop there, but
continues to give the most unabashedly natural law exposition of civil
liberties ever delivered in a Canadian Court.42 Nevertheless, he finds
that the strictures of positive law may circumscribe residual liberties
although under the principles of our law no prior or antecedent
restraint is placed upon them. His Lordship concludes by stating that
"civil rights of the same nature" as those against defamation, assault,
false imprisonment and the like, "arise also as protection against
infringements of these freedoms".43 Does his Lordship by this state-
ment mean only that the positive law may expressly provide safe-
guards against infringements of these "liberties"? If so, what does
40 Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, footnote 7, at p. 324.
41 Ibid., at p. 329.
42 "Strictly speaking, civil rights arise from positive law; but freedom of
speech, religion and the inviolability of the person, are original freedoms
which are at once the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of
human beings and the primary conditions of their community life within
a legal order. It is in the circumscription of these liberties by the creation
of civil rights in persons who may be injured by their exercise, and by the
sanctions of public law, that the positive law operates. What we realize
is the residue inside that periphery. Their significant relation to our law
lies in this, that under its principles to which there are no minor exceptions,
there is no prior or antecedent restraint placed upon them: the penalties, civil
or criminal, attach to results which their exercise may bring about, and
apply as consequential incidents. So we have the civil rights against defama-
tion, assault, false imprisonment and the like, and the punishments of the
criminal law; but the sanctions of the latter lie within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Dominion. Civil rights of the same nature arise also as protection




it add to the discussion? Or, are there entrenched civil rights pre-
cluding infringement of the original freedoms of speech, religion and
inviolability of the person? If so, how can this interpretation be
reconciled with the concession that positive law may circumscribe
these liberties? Is it Rand J.'s position that the positive law may
operate to circumscribe these liberties only to the extent that their
exercise may injure other parties? If this is a correct interpretation,
the problem resolves itself to a matter of weighing the interest of
the free exercise of the freedom of expression and the competing
interest of the other parties thereby affected to arrive at a just
solution. This answer in turn raises a series of questions. Is it the
function of the judge or the legislator to effect a balance between
the competing interests? If it is for the legislator to determine the
proper balance, should it be Parliament or the Provincial Legislature,
and what is the role of the court in the competition between these
legislative bodies?44 As this last question indicates, this is a decision
which the court cannot avoid-the United States Supreme Court does
not even try, but it has a Constitution with entrenched rights to salve
its conscience-in whatever form the problems may arise. Even if it
is for the legislator to effect a general balance between interests, it
is inevitable that the Court experience the agony of decision in any
specific case. It was done in McKay v. The Queen.
45
It is significant that in beginning with radically different premises
from those of the preceding consideration, we have arrived at the
very same issue to be decided. However, a number of questions were
raised on the way, which Rand J. did not answer, but Cartwright J.
in McKay v. The Queen46 by implication did.
In arriving at his decision in Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. of
Quebec47 Abbott J. stated:
The Canada Elections Act, the provisions of the British North America
Act which provide for Parliament meeting at least once a year and for
the election of a new parliament at least every five years, and the Senate
and House of Commons Act, are examples of enactments which make
specific statutory provision for ensuring the exercise of this right of
public candidates for Parliament or for a Legislature, and of citizens
generally, to explain, criticize, debate and discuss in the freest possible
manner such matters as the qualifications, the policies, and the political,
economic and social principles advocated by such candidates or by the
political parties or groups of which they may be members.
This right cannot be abrogated by a Provincial Legislature, and the power
of such Legislature to limit it, is restricted to what may be necessary
to protect purely private rights, such as for example provincial laws
of defamation.48
His Lordship's reasoning carries with it two possible implications.
On the one hand, the problem may be regarded as a competition
44 In Switzman v. E7bling and A.-G. of Quebec, Rand J. distinguished
between "civil liberties" and "civil rights". The former fell within federal
and the latter within provincial legislative competence.
45 Supra, footnote 2.
46 Ibid.
47 Supra, footnote 7.
48 Ibid., at pp. 327-328.
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between federal and provincial jurisdiction. The court's function is
to look to the pith and substance of the legislation and this is deter-
mined by weighing the relative importance of the competing interests.
The alternative implication is more in the nature of an attitude in
carrying out this task, rather than an independent line of reasoning.
Abbott J. infers from the nature of the political institutions created
by the British North America Act certain rights, unexpressed but
which necessarily follow if these political institutions are to function
in a meaningful way. The ascertainment of these is inevitably a
question of values, which are bolstered by contemporary conceptions
of human dignity and of what is essential to meaningful participation
in a political society.49 Since these problems before the court arise in
penumbral areas, the decision at which the court arrives determines
whether it will lead public opinion or follow it. But the difference
between this approach and the weighing of the value of the competing
claims to jurisdiction in the former approach, is that here one com-
mences with the premise that the two claims are not equal. The legis-
lation will ultimately have to justify itself, even though the court
adopts as a legal principle a presumption in its favour,50 because the
citizen has vested rights. Furthermore, the doctrine that under the
B.N.A. Act all legislative power is distributed either to Parliament
or the Legislatures will be subject to this additional qualification.51
It would appear that this was the position of Mr. Justice Abbott, for,
he continues:
Although it is not necessary, of course, to determine this question for
the purposes of the present appeal, . . . I am also of opinion that as our
49 A practical example of this phenomenon is the history of the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution from Pessy v. Ferg-
uson (1897), 163 U.S. 537 to Brown v. The Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S.
483, 349 U.S. 294. It would be a mistake to attempt to separate the issues in
these cases from the political implications of the decisions. School segregation
is more than just a question of which neighbourhood school a particular child
will attend. The answer to that question has a profound effect on the role
that child will later play in the political life of his society, even as an ordinary
voter. Civil rights are not severable from the political structure of a society.
Any action on the former will have its reaction on the latter. The difficulty
is in defining what is meant by "civil rights", the relative importance of the
components of that concept, and the degree to which they can be circum-
scribed to produce a result consistent with the nature of the political Institu-
tions the society wishes to maintain. Even in Switzman v. Elbling and A..G.
of Quebec, the political implications of the power to close a house was readily
apparent to the Court.
Although there are probably no entrenched rights in Canada as there
are in the U.S. Constitution, the approach by the American cases is helpful
in determining the bounds of provincial power in this area.
50 For a discussion of this principle in the United States, see J. B. Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law (1893),
7 Harv. L. Rev. 129.
51 Express limitations exist in respect of education under s. 93, the use
of the English and French languages in Quebec and in federal legislative
and judicial proceedings under s. 133, the tenure of judges (s. 99). The Courts
have inferred limitations with respect to interdelegation of legislative powers
between Parliament and Legislature (A.-G. of Nova Scotia v. A.-G. of Canada,
[1951] S.C.R. 31, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 369), and the attempt by legislation to
preclude actions in the courts challenging the validity of some piece of legisla-
tion (Crown Grain Co. v. Day, [1908] A.C. 504). See Bora Laskin, An Inquiry
into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 77, at p. 100.
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constitutional Act now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this
right of discussion and debate. The power of Parliament to limit it is,
in my view, restricted to such powers as may be exercisable under its
exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect to criminal law and to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the nation.5 2
In stating that a political activity in the Federal field which has
heretofore been lawful can be prohibited only by Parliament, Cart-
wright J. opted for the traditional view that there are no entrenched
rights in the Canadian constitution.5 3 The problem which the court
faces is to make an allocation of powers between the provincial and
central legislature. In making this allocation, Mr. Justice Cartwright
speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada drew a distinction between
a civil right in the province and a right enjoyed as a citizen of Canada.
This distinction casts a new light on the interpretation of s. 92(13).54
"Property and Civil Rights in the Province" no longer means merely
that a province cannot legislate to affect property or rights in a
different province or a different country and must keep within its
own territorial bounds. The juxtaposition is not just province against
province (which would mean that property and civil rights are wholly
of provincial concern but divided among ten provinces) but rather
province against Dominion. What then are these civil rights which
cannot be affected by provincial legislation? The right to seek by
lawful means to influence one's fellow electors is one of them. Mr.
Justice Cartwright mentions no others. Could a province enact legis-
lation expropriating private property without compensation? 55 Are
there any limits to provincial regulation of private economic activity,
apart from those relating to intra-provincial marketing which falls
within the federal domain?5 6 Are there any basic rights to which
52 Supra, footnote 7, at p. 328.
53 This is consistent with Mr. Justice Cartwright's previous pronounce-
ments on this subject. When counsel in Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, foot-
note 7, referred to a number of American decisions, Cartwright J. stated
that he was unable to derive any assistance from them since they were
founded on provisions of the Constitution limiting the power to make laws in
relation to such matters. He continued (at p. 384): "Under the British North
America Act, .... the whole range of legislative power is committed either
to Parliament or the Provincial Legislatures and competence to deal with any
subject matter must exist in one or other of such bodies. There are thus no
rights possessed by citizens of Canada which cannot be modified by either
Parliament or the Legislature, but it may often be a matter of difficulty to
decide which of such bodies has the legislative power in a particular case."
54 See also the decision of Rand J. in Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G.
Quebec, which foreshadows this result.
55 See Florence Mining Co. Ltd. v. Cobalt Lake Mining Co. Ltd. (1909),
18 O.L.R. 275, at p. 279, aff'd 43 O.L.R. 474 (P.C.). But of. Montreal v. Montreal
Harbour Commisioners, [1926) A.C. 299 (P.C.), suggesting a requirement
of compensation at least in respect of provincial Crown lands. See Bora
Laskin, loc. cit., supra, footnote 51, at pp. 104-105.
56 Laskin thinks that there is not. At p. 104 (Zoe. cit., footnote 51) he
states: "There is ... no constitutional freedom from regulation by both pro-
vincial and federal authority; either one or the other may interpose controls,
subject only to such limitations as are immanent in the range of power which
is invoked or such as arise under s. 121 of the British North America Act
(the "free trade" section)." See A.-G. of Ontario v. Winner, [19541 A.C. 541,
[1954] 4 D.L.R. 657 (P.C.) where it was held that the province could not
prevent an American citizen from carrying on an interprovincial undertaking.
Quite apart from the interprovincial aspect of the undertaking, what was
[Footnote continued on page 310.]
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every Canadian as a citizen of Canada is entitled?57 Can a province
legislate so as to discriminate against an individual? a group? an
entire province? The implications of McKay v. The Queen 8 are too
far reaching to be adequately dealt with here. "Property and Civil
Rights in the Province" which to the courts of Sir Lyman Duff C.J.
and Viscount Haldane was an impregnable fortress59 may yet turn out
to be a Maginot line with a very exposed flank. Time, the long, the
countless, brings to light all that is unseen.
IMl
The township by-law was upheld on the basis that "if an enact-
ment . . . of a subordinate body to which legislative power is dele-
gated, is capable of receiving a meaning according to which its opera-
tion is restricted to matters within the power of the enacting body
it shall be interpreted accordingly." 60 Consequently, the by-law and
the legislation authorizing it is valid in so far as it deals with signs,
but does not extend to election signs in thelcourse of a federal election.
J. W. MIK"
objectionable about this licensing scheme was its discriminatory character.
Would the result be the same today if the province by means of a licencing
scheme (having no relation to public health or welfare, such as licencIng
of doctors, accountants, etc.) purported to prevent a person from carrying
on an undertaking wholly within the province? Such power is taken for
granted in the regulating activity of agencies like the Motor Vehicles Trans-
port Board, which may refuse an application for a licence because increased
competition would be detrimental to current licence holders and indirectly
the public. Thus, an applicant may be deprived of earning his livelihood In
this particular activity. But what if the legislation were discriminatory?
See Laskin, ibid., at p. 106: .. ."[O]ly a constitutional amendment would
put possible enactment of discriminatory legislation beyond the reach of
both Parliament and the provinciaZ legislatures." Italics mine.
57 See Winner v. B.VM.T. (Eastern) Ltd. and A..G. of New Brunswicc,
[1951] S.C.R. 88[1951951] 4 D.L.R. 529, at p. 918 (S.C.R.), 557 (D.L.R.) where
Rand J. stated " . a Province cannot, by depriving a Canadian of the
means of working, force him to leave it: it cannot divest him of his right
or capacity to remain and to engage in work there: that capacity Inhering
as a constituent element of his citizenship status is beyond nullification by
provincial action" See also Roncarelli v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689
(S.C.C.). See also Bora Laskin, loc. cit., footnote 51, at pp. 109 et seq.
58 Supra, footnote 2.
59 In re Board of Commerce Act (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456, per Duff J., at p.
508, on appeal [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.). The significance of McKay v. The
Queen does not lie so much in what the provinces cannot do, but in what
the Dominion can. Is the Court in tune with political developments in present
day Canada?
60 Supra, footnote 2, at pp. 536-537.
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